In December 1992, the Cadbury Committee published the Code of Best Practice which recommended that boards of publicly-traded UK corporations include at least three outside directors and that the positions of the chairman of the board and chief executive officer not be held by a single individual. The underlying presumption was that these government-sponsored recommendations would lead to enhanced board oversight. As a test of that presumption, we analyze the relation between top management~rnover and corporate performance. We find that CEO turnover increased following publications of the Code, that the relationship between CEO turnover and performance was strengthened following publication of the Code, and that the increase in the sensitivity of turnover to performance was concentrated among firms that adopted the Cadbury Committee's recommendations.
The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance and Top Management Turnover
In December 1992, the Cadbury Committee published the Code of Best Practice which recommended that boards of publicly-traded UK corporations include at least three outside directors and that the positions of the chairman of the board and chief executive officer not be held by a single individual. The underlying presumption was that these government-sponsored recommendations would lead to enhanced board oversight. As a test of that presumption, we analyze the relation between top management~rnover and corporate performance. We find that CEO turnover increased following publications of the Code, that the relationship between CEO turnover and performance was strengthened following publication of the Code, and that the increase in the sensitivity of turnover to performance was concentrated among firms that adopted the Cadbury Committee's recommendations.
The Cadbury Committee was appointed by the Conservative Government of the United Kingdom (UK) in May 1991 with a broad mandate to "...address the financial aspects of corporate governance." 1 In December 1992, the Committee issued its report which recommended, among other things, that boards of directors of publicly traded companies include at least three non-executive (i.e., outside) directors as members and that the positions of Chairman of the Board (Chairman) and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of these companies be held by two different individuals. The apparent reasoning underlying the Committee's recommendations is that greater independence of a corporate board will improve the quality of board oversight.
To appreciate the potential significance of the Cadbury Committee and its recommendations, it is important to appreciate the environment surrounding the establishment of the Committee. First, the Committee was appointed in the aftermath of the "scandalous" collapse of several prominent UK companies during the later 1980s and early 1990s, including Ferranti International PLC, Colorol Group, Pollypeck International PLC, Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and Maxwell Communication Corporation. The broadsheet press popularly attributed these failures and others to weak governance systems, lax board oversight, and the vesting of control in the hands of a single top executive.
The Cadbury Committee was set up in response to a number of corporate scandals that cast doubt on the systems for controlling the ways companies are run. The downfall of powerful figures such as Asil Nadir or the late Robert Maxwell, whose personal control over their companies was complete, raised fears about the concentration ofpower.
Self-regulation Seen as the Way Forward, Financial Times, May 28, 1992.
Second, historically, executive (i.e., inside) directors have heavily dominated UK At its issuance, the Cadbury Report was greeted with skepticism both by those who felt that it went too far and by those who felt that it did not go far enough. The general unease of those who felt it went too far can best be summarized as a concern that the delicate balance between shareholders and managers is best left to the forces of competition. A less generous interpretation of this perspective, which was most frequently espoused by corporate managers, was "leave us alone -we know best".
There is danger in an over emphasis on monitoring, on non-executive directors independence from the business of the corporation; on controls over decision making activities of companies. When coupled with the clearly reduced status of executives on the governing boards, such requirements must blunt the competitive edge and deflect the entrepreneurial drive which characterises participants, let alone success in a free market. .Sir Owen Green, Pall Mall Lecture on UK Corporate Governance, February 24, 1994 The general concern of those who thought that the report did not go far enough centered on the "voluntary" nature of the Report's recommendations.
The committees' recommendations are steps in the right direction. But, if the government is to address the problems which led to the Maxwell, Polly Peck, Bee! and other recent scandals, then new rules in a legal framework are required... Shareholders, investors and creditors will have been disappointed that just when the corporate failures of recent years cried out for bold and imaginative legal return, the body from which so much had been expected came up with a little, tinkering and a voluntary code. Cadbury Committee Draft Orders Mixed News for Shareholders, Financial Times, June 2, 1992 The purpose of this study is to cast light on what heretofore has been largely a vitriolic dispute by investigating empirically the impact of the key Cadbury Committee recommendations --that boards include at least three non-executive members and that the positions of Chairman and CEO be held by two different individuals --on the quality of board oversight in UK firms over the period 1989 to 1995. We begin our investigation with the presumption that an important oversight role of boards of directors is the hiring and firing of top corporate management. We further presume that one indicator of effective board oversight is that the board will replace poorly performing top management. With those presumptions in place, we empirically investigate the relationship between top management turnover and corporate performance before and after the Cadbury Committee issued its recommendations.
To conduct this investigation, we assemble a random sample of 460 UK companies from the Official List of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) as of December 1988. For each company, we collect information on top management turnover, board composition, and corporate performance for up to seven years before and four years after the issuance of the Cadbury Report. With these data, we determine that the relationship between top management turnover and corporate performance was statistically significant both before and after adoption of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations --poorer performance is associated with higher turnover. Importantly, for our purposes, this relationship is significantly stronger following adoption of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations.
Upon further exploration, the increased sensitivity of turnover to performance appears to be attributable to the increase in outside board members following Cadbury.
We view this study as making contributions in both the small and the large of corporate governance. From a narrow perspective, this study thoroughly examines the effect of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations on the relationship between top management turnover and corporate performance in the UK. From a broader perspective, this study contains implications for corporate governance and board composition generally, and augments studies by Agrawal and Knoeber (1994) , Bhagat and Black (1996; 1998) (1990) , Kang and Shivdasani (1995) , Kaplan (1994a, b) , Martin and McConnell (1991) , Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Weisbach (1988) among others.
The next section briefly describes the Cadbury Committee Report on the "Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance". Section II describes our sample selection procedure.
Section III presents descriptive statistics for the sample. We reserve our review of related studies until after we present our empirical findings. In Section IV, we discuss our results in the context of prior empirical investigations and present our conclusions.
I. Cadbury Committee Report
The Cadbury Committee was chaired by a leading industrialist, Sir Adrian Cadbury, CEO of the Cadbury confectionery empire, and included other senior industry executives, finance specialists, and academics. The Committee was charged with examining the "financial aspects of corporate governance" in UK firms. The committee issued a draft report of its recommendations for public comment on May 27, 1992. Between then and December 1, 1992, the committee accepted comments and issued its final report on December 1, 1992.
The cornerstone of the Cadbury Report is "The Code of Best Practice" which presents the committee's recommendations on the structure and responsibilities of corporate boards of directors. The two key recommendations affecting the board structure were that boards of directors of publicly-traded companies include at least three outside directors as members and that the positions of Chairman and CEO be held by two different individuals. 2 2 The report also recommended: (i) full disclosure of the pay of the chairman and the highest paid director; (ii) shareholders' approval on executive directors contracts exceeding three years; (iii) executive directors pay be set by a board sub-committee (the remuneration committee) comprised primarily of outsiders and; (iv) directors should establish a sub-committee of the main board, comprised mainly of outside directors. to report on the effectiveness of the company's system of internal control. including mechanisms for risk assessment and management.
As part of its report, the Committee "urged" that the boards of all companies turnover in the top executive position, but not turnover in the top management team (because that individual is still with the firm). We do not count as turnover, the event in which the position of Executive Chairman is split into the positions of Chairman of the board and CEO.
We classify turnover as "normal" or "forced" by examining news articles contained in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times, and Macarthy's News Information Service. A turnover event is considered to be forced under any of the following three circumstances: (1) a news article states that the executive was "fired"; (2) a news article states that the executive "resigned", the executive was less than 60 years old, no other article indicates that the executive had taken a position elsewhere, and no other article cites health, family or death as the reason for the executive's departure; or (3) a news article indicates that the company was experiencing poor performance, the executive was less than 60 years old, no other article indicates that the executive had taken a position elsewhere, and no other article cited health, family or death as the reason for the executive's departure. All other turnover is considered "normal" turnover.
Neither of our turnover measures is a pristine characterization of the phenomenon that we wish to capture. In particular, we would like to be able to identify· instances in which an executive has departed his position involuntarily. Our first measure, i.e., all departures, undoubtedly includes a significant number of voluntary departures. Thus, this measure will be an overstatement of the number we would like to have. However, if the rate of voluntary departures is constant before and after Cadbury, any differential in the rate of total turnover will represent a change in involuntary turnover such that our total turnover measure will capture any change in the rate of forced turnover. Even then, of course, any effect will be estimated with noise and the significance level of the effect will be downwardly biased.
Our second measure of turnover, i.e., ''forced'' turnover, will embed a different type of measurement error. Because our classification system is based on secondary sources, i.e., news accounts, any modifications in the way in which top management changes are reported through time could give rise to misclassifications. Of course, depending upon the way in which the practice of reporting top management turnover changed, any modification may lead to either an over-or under-statement of forced turnover. Our hope is that by using three sources to cross-reference turnover events, we have minimized the instances in which we have misclassified turnover due to a change in reporting practices.
We are interested in the relationship between top management turnover and corporate performance. In our tests, we employ both accounting earnings and stock returns data to measure performance. Specifically, as our measure of accounting earnings, we use 3-year average industry-adjusted return on assets (IAROA). For each year, for each firm in the sample, we calculate ROA as earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes (EBDIT) divided by beginning of the year total assets. Then for each firm with the same Financial Times Industrial Classification as the firm in our sample, we calculate ROA in the same way.
Next, each year, for each Industrial Classification group, we determine the median ROA.
IAROA is calculated by subtracting the industry median ROA from the sample firm's ROA for each of the three years prior to a turnover event. The simple average of these three
IAROAs is in our measure of accounting performance.
As our measure of stock price performance, we calculate market model cumulative excess returns (CERs) where market model parameters are estimated over a 280 trading-day period beginning 30 days after the announcement of the change in management. The valueweighted FTSE All Share Index is used as the market return. CERs are computed using daily returns beginning 36 calendar months prior to, and ending 2 days prior to, the announcement of the change in top management.
ID. Characteristics of the Sample
To conduct our analysis, we split management turnover along two dimensions. First, for the full sample, we split turnover events into pre-and post-Cadbury time periods. The pre-Cadbury time period includes all top management turnover during 1989 through 1992.
The post-Cadbury time period includes all turnover during 1993 through 1996. Descriptive data for these two samples are presented in the fIrst column of Table 1 .
Second, we classify the observations according to whether the fInn that experienced the turnover was (or was not) in compliance with the two key provisions of the Code. This second classifIcation scheme gives rise to three sets of fIrms. The fIrst set includes those fInns that were in compliance with the Code for each year that the fInn is in our sample (hereafter, the "always-in-compliance" set, 150 finns). The second set includes those finns that came into compliance with the Code during a year in which the finn was in our sample (hereafter, the "adopted-Cadbury" set, 288 firms). The third set includes those fIrms that were never in compliance with the Code during any year in which the firm was in our sample (hereafter, the "never-in-compliance" set, 22 firms). Descriptive data for the first and third sets are split into pre-and post-Cadbury time periods. These data are presented in columns two and four of Table 1 . Descriptive data for the second set of firms (Le., the adopted-Cadbury set) are split into pre-and post-Cadbury adoption time periods (i.e., y-4 to y-l and y+ 1 to y+4, where y equals the year in which the firm came into compliance with the Code).
These data are presented in column three of Table 1 . Table I presents the market value of equity, total assets, and leverage for each set of fIrms. If there is anything remarkable in these data, it is the similarity across the various sets of firms and time periods along these dimensions. For example, the pre-Cadbury mean book value of assets for the 3 sets of firms is £148.8m, £150.lm and £146.8m, respectively. These data exemplify the commonality of data across the sets of firms. The median board increased by two members, from 5 to 7 directors, and most of this increase occurred among the adopted-Cadbury set of companies.
Panel A of

IV. Management Turnover
What is clear from our analysis thus far is that the Cadbury Committee's recommendations had considerable impact on the size and composition of boards of directors, and on the number of firms in which one individual holds the titles of Chainnan and CEO.
The question to which we now turn is --what impact, if any, have these changes had on top management turnover?
A. Incidence and Rate of Top Management Turnover
Panel A of Table II presents the incidence and rates of turnover in the top executive for the full sample, the always-in-compliance set, the adopted-Cadbury set, and the never-incompliance set. For the full sample, the always-in-compliance set, and the never-incompliance set, the turnover statistics are split into two four-year periods: a pre-Cadbury period (1989 through 1992) and a post-Cadbury period (1993 through 1996) . For the adopted-Cadbury set, the turnover statistics are split into two four-year periods surrounding the year in which the finn came into compliance with the key provisions of the Code. The incidence of turnover is the number of instances in which we identified a change in the top executive. The rate of turnover is an annualized rate calculated as the incidence of turnover The incidence (and rate) of turnover in the top executive increased significantly from before to after Cadbury. This increase in turnover is due to an increase in what we have classified as forced turnover. For example, for the full sample, the "rate of top executive turnover increased by 1.23% (i.e., from 6.48% to 7.71 %), and the rate of forced turnover increased by 1.20% (i.e., from 3.10% to 4.30%). Furthermore, the increase in turnover in the top executive is concentrated in the adopted-Cadbury set of firms. For this set of firms, the rate of top executive turnover increased by 1.57% (i.e., from 7.24% to 8.87%), and the rate of forced turnover increased by 2.27% (i.e., 2.71 % to 4.98%). For the always-in-compliance set, the rate of turnover and the rate of forced turnover is essentially unchanged from before to after Cadbury. For the never-in-compliance set, the rate of turnover declined modestly from before to after Cadbury, however, given the small sample size, we are inclined not to place too much weight to this result. Thus, the increase in turnover of the top executive following Cadbury is primarily attributable to those firms that adopted the key provisions of the Code of Best Practice.
From Panel B, for the full sample of firms, for the top management team excluding the top executive, the rate and incidence of all turnover increased from before to after Cadbury, albeit the increase is not statistically significant according to conventional standards (p-value =0.15). However, for the adopted-Cadbury set, the incidence and rate of turnover is statistically significant. For this set of firms, the rate of turnover in the top team excluding the 16 top executive increased by 1.27% (i.e., from 4.34% to 5.61 %). For the always-in-compliance and never~in-compliance sets of firms, the rate of turnover in the top team is essentially unchanged.
The picture that emerges from forced turnover in the top management team excluding the top executive is less clear-cut. For the full sample, the incidence and rate of forced turnover increases by statistically significant magnitudes from before to after Cadbury.
Furthermore, the incidence and rate of forced turnover increased for the adopted-Cadbury set from before to after Cadbury and the increase is close to significant at conventional levels (pvalue = 0.12). The fly in the ointment resides in the always-in-compliance set. For this set of firms, which were already in compliance, the incidence and rate of forced turnover does increase by a statistically significant margin. Presumably that increase cannot be attributed to the Cadbury Committee's recommendations.
Turnover data for the top executive are consistent with an argument that the Cadbury Committees' recommendations have increased the quality of board oversight. That is, turnover, especially forced turnover, in the top executive position has increased and that increase is concentrated in the set of firms that adopted the key provisions of the Code of Best
Practice. The apparent clear-cut connection between top executive turnover and the Cadbury Committee's recommendations is less clear-cut for other members of the top executive team.
The attenuation of that connection could be due to either of two phenomena: Either increased board oversight following Cadbury focused on the top executive or the reporting of turnover for second-tier managers is not as thorough as that for the top executive.
Of course, it could be that the increased management turnover that we have documented following Cadbury is random across firms. The pertinent issue for our purposes is whether turnover is correlated with corporate performance. That is, are the "right" managers being replaced? That is the question to which we now tum. Regardless of whether we consider all turnover or forced turnover, regardless of the performance measure used, and regardless of which set of firms we consider, the incidence and rate of turnover increases as we move from the best to the poorest performing firms both before and after Cadbury. That is, turnover of the top executive is concentrated in the poorest performing firms both before and after Cadbury. To the extent that there is any difference across the panels, it is that forced turnover is especially concentrated in the poorest performing quartiles.
B. Relationship between Top Management Turnover and Corporate Performance
The data also hint that the increase in top executive turnover from before to after Cadbury that we documented in Table IT is due to an increase in turnover in the lowest two performance quartiles in the adopted-Cadbury set of firms. For example, for this set of firms in Panel A, the rate of turnover in Quartiles 1 and 2 increased by 6.6% (Le., from 9.0% to 15.6%) and 2.8% (i.e., from 7.6% to 10.4%) respectively from before to after adoption of Cadbury. Both of these increases have p-values less than 0.05. In comparison, for the always-in-compliance set, in the same bottom two quartiles, the rate of turnover is essentially unchanged from before to after Cadbury.
The data for turnover in the top management team excluding the top executive (not shown in a table) generally show any increase in the incidence and rate of turnover as we move from the best to the poorest performing firms, however, the relationship is not as linear as shown in Table ITI for top executives. 7 For example, in the top two IAROA quartiles of the full sample of firms for forced turnover, the rate of turnover in the top team excluding the top executive is 1.0%. For the bottom two quartiles, the rate of forced turnover is 5.1%.
However, the rate of turnover increases slightly from 4.25% to 6.1 % as we move from the quartile 1 to quartile 2.
C.
Multivariate Analysis of the Relationship between Top Management Turnover and Corporate Performance
The final questions, to which we now tum, are whether the relationship between turnover and performance is statistically significant and whether the sensitivity of turnover to performance is greater following Cadbury. To answer that question and to control for other factors that may influence managerial turnover, we estimate logit regressions. Initially, we estimate regressions for the top executive in which the dependent variable is 1 if a firm 7 These data in tabular form are available from the authors upon request.
experiences turnover in the top executive during a calendar year and zero otherwise. We estimate separate regressions for all turnover and for forced turnover. We estimate separate regressions using three-year prior IAROA and three-year CER as our perfonnance measures.
We include four control variables in each regression: fraction of shares owned by directors, fraction of shares owned by institutional investors, number of block shareholders, and log of total assets. (Subsequently, we estimate the same regressions for turnover in the top team excluding the top executive.)
The results of our regressions for the top executive are presented in Tables IV and V. In negative and, with one exception, each has a p-value of less than 0.05. Thus, top executive turnover is significantly negatively correlated with corporate perfonnance: the poorer the finn's perfonnance, the greater the likelihood that the top executive will depart his position.
Of the four control variables, only the fraction of shares owned by directors regularly has a p-value less than 0.10. The coefficient of this variable is always negative which indicates that after controlling for perfonnance, increased share ownership by the board reduces the likelihood that the top executive will depart his position.
We now tum to the effect of Cadbury on top executive turnover and the effect of Cadbury on the relationship between top executive turnover and corporate perfonnance. To begin, the first regression in each panel is estimated for the full sample of finns and includes an indicator variable (Dum for 1993-96) which takes a value of 0 for all observations before January 1993 (the pre-Cadbury period) and a value of 1 for all observations after that date (the post-Cadbury period). In each regression, the coefficient of the indicator variable Dum for 1993-96 is positive with p-values ranging from 0.03 to 0.11. Thus, even after controlling for corporate performance, turnover is higher in the post-Cadbury period. However, as we noted in Table III , increased turnover appears to be attributable to the set of firms that came into compliance with the Cadbury Committees' recommendations (the-adopted-Cadbury set)
as opposed to those firms that were always in compliance with Cadbury.
To determine whether the Cadbury/turnover relationship is due to a general phenomenon affecting all firms or whether it is due specifically to a change in board structures traceable to the Cadbury recommendations, we estimate the regression separately for the always-in-compliance set of firms and for the adopted-Cadbury set. The only difference in the regressions is that for the adopted-Cadbury set, the indicator variable (Dum For the adopted-Cadbury set, the coefficient of the indicator variable Dum for Adopt is always positive with p-values ranging from 0.06 to 0.09. Additionally, the magnitude of the coefficient is 10 times the magnitude of the coefficient of the Cadbury Dummy (Dum for 1993-96) for the always-in-compliance set. Thus, the publication of the Code of Best Practice did not have an impact, per se, on the rate of turnover among top UK executives; rather the effect was concentrated among those fIrms that altered their board structures to comply with the Code. This is not to say that the rate of turnover among top executives in fIrms that were always-in-compliance was "too low" either before or after Cadbury. The data only show that the rate of turnover for these fIrms did not change between the pre-and post-Cadbury periods.
In comparison, the rate of turnover increased significantly among ·firms that came into compliance with the Cadbury recommendations during the period of this study.
To determine whether the increase in turnover is correlated with performance, we estimate a regression with the adopted-Cadbury set of fIrms that includes the Adopted Cadbury Dummy (Dum for Adopt) and the Adopted Cadbury Dummy interacted with our measures of performance (either lAROA or CER) along with our measures of performance (Dum for Adopt x Perform) and our four control variables. These are the key regressions of our analysis and are reported as the fourth regression in each panel.
The coefficient of the interaction variable will indicate whether the increase in turnover among fIrms that adopted Cadbury is randomly distributed across those fIrms or is concentrated among the poorest performing fIrms. In each regression, the coefficient of the interaction variable is negative with p-values ranging from 0.02 to 0.08. Additionally, the coefficient of the Adopted Cadbury Dummy (Dum-for-Adopt) is reduced by 75% and now has p-values ranging from 0.66 to 0.76. These results indicate that the increase in top executive turnover is not random, rather it is (inversely) correlated with performance: After controlling for performance, the likelihood that the top executive will depart his position is greater once a poorly performing fIrm comes into compliance with the key provisions of the Apparently, the increased sensitivity of turnover to corporate performance for the adopted-Cadbury set (and the contemporaneous loss in significance of the interaction of Dum-for-Adopt with performance) is attributable to the increase in the fraction of outside directors. Splitting the responsibilities of the Chairman and CEO between two individuals appears to have no effect on the rate of turnover in the top executive.
Two further observations are worth making. The coefficient of board size is always negative, which indicates that turnover is less likely, the larger the board; however, with pvalues that range from 0.20 to 0.37, this variable is not significant at traditionally accepted levels. The more interesting variable is the interaction of board size with our measures of performance. The coefficients of this variable are also always negative and have p-values that range from 0.07 to 0.10. Thus, the sensitivity of turnover to performance is lower the larger the board. Or to put it slightly differently, firms with smaller boards show more sensitivity to performance (in terms of turnover in the top executive) than do firms with larger boards.
The regressions reported in Tables IV and V 
V. Commentary and Conclusions
As we noted at the outset, we view this study as making contributions in the small and the large of corporate governance and of the connection between management turnover and corporate performance. From a narrow perspective, we have analyzed in detail the effect of the Cadbury Committee's key recommendations on the structure of UK boards of directors and on the impact of these recommendations on the connection between top management turnover and corporate performance. We document a general increase in the size of corporate boards, an increase in the fraction of outside directors, and an increase in the number of firms in which the positions of CEO and chairman are held by two different individuals following publication of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations in December 1992. We also document an increase in the rate of top management turnover following publication of the Cadbury Report and that this increase is concentrated among firms that came into compliance with the key provisions of the Code of Best Practice during the period of our study. We further document a significant (negative) correlation between top management turnover and corporate performance both before and after the Cadbury Report: the poorer the performance, the higher the rate of turnover. Among firms that came into compliance with the Code during the period of our study, we find an increase in the correlation of turnover to corporate performance following their adoption of the Code. Finally, this increase in the sensitivity of turnover to performance appears to be due to the increase in the fraction of outside directors, rather than splitting the responsibilities of the CEO and chairman between two individuals.
Thus, when we refer to our findings as contributing to the small of corporate governance, we mean to say that our study examines the link between management turnover, corporate performance, and board structure in the specific context of the issuance and the implementation of the Cadbury Report. We do not mean to minimize the importance of our findings to the firms and investors involved nor to the global economy, after all the Code applies to all publicly-traded UK companies and the UK's GNP ranks 7th among all nations.
From a broader perspective, we mean to say that our results are likely to have implications beyond the confines of the Cadbury Report and add to the broader literature on management turnover, corporate performance, corporate governance and board structure.
Prior studies on the relationship between top management turnover and corporate performance include Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , Franks and Mayer (1995) , Gilson (1989) , Huson, Parrino and Starks (1998), Jensen and Murphy (1990) , Kang and Shivdasani (1995) and Kaplan (1994a, b) , Martin and McConnell (1991) , Mikkelson and Partch (1997) , Morek, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Weisbach (1988) . These studies cover various time periods beginning in 1962 and encompass Japan, the US, and the UK. Each of these studies reports a negative and significant correlation between top management turnover and at least one measure of corporate performance, either accounting profitability or stock returns. Our results complement those of earlier studies and add to them in that we document a negative and significant correlation between top management turnover and corporate performance and we document an increase in the sensitivity of turnover to performance following publication of the Cadbury Report and the adoption of the Code of Best Practice by UK companies.
Our study also complements and adds to the literature on board composition and corporate performance. Bhagat and Black (1998) dichotomize research on this topic into two categories: (1) studies of whether board composition determines the way in which boards accomplish discrete tasks, such as hiring and firing top management,' responding to hostile takeovers, setting CEO compensation, and so forth and (2) studies of how board composition influences the firm's overall profitability. Our study fits the former category.
Prior studies of board composition and management turnover provide mixed results.
Weisbach ( find that the sensitivity of turnover to performance is unrelated to the fraction of outside directors. 9
Our results are consistent with Weisbach in that we determine that, among poorly performing firms, top management turnover increases as the fraction of outside board members increases. Like Weisbach, our results are contrary to those of Kang and Shivdasani and that difference may very well be attributable to cross-country differences in the role of 9 Mikkelson and Partch (1997) examine 200 publicly-traded US companies over the period 1984 through 1993. They find no relationship between the probability of management turnover and the fraction of outside directors on the board. However, they do not examine the sensitivity of the relationship between turnover and boards and outside directors. If so, the US and the UK apparently are more similar to each other on this dimension than is either one to Japan.
As we noted, our study fits into the first category of research identified by Bhagat and Black (1998) . Having examined the impact of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations on one specific board task, in a subsequent study, we intend to tum our attention to the second category by examining the effect of the Committee's recommendations on overall corporate performance.
perfonnance to the fraction of outside directors. Thus their study and ours are not directly comparable. Descriptive statistics for a random sample of 460 publicly-traded non-financial UK finns over the period 1989-19%. The sample finns are classified into 3 sets based on whether they were (a) Always-in-Compliance, (b) Adopted-Cadbury recommendations and (c) Never-in-Compliance with the Cadbury recommendations. Sample finns in (a) and (c) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre-and post-publication of the Cadbury Report (1989-1992 and 1993 to 1996) . Sample finns in (b) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre-and post-adoption of the Cadbury recommendations (y-4 to y-I and y+l to y+4 . ' . . 6 (40.6) 1993-96 21.5 (20.9) .. and· denotes significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively. Table n Incidence and Rates of Top Management Turnover in UK Companies, 1989 through 1996 Top management turnover for a random sample of 460 publicly-traded non-financial UK firms over the period 1989 through 1996. The sample firms are classified into 3 sets based on whether they were (a) Always-in-Compliance, (b) Adopted-Cadbury recommendations, and (c) Never-in-Compliance with the Cadbury recommendations. Sample firms in (a) and (c) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre-and post-publication of the Cadbury Report (1989-1992 and 1993 to 1996) . Sample firms in (b) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre-and post-adoption of the Cadbury recommendations (y-4 to y-l and y+l to y+4). For each firm, top management names in the Corporate Register are compared from 1988 through 1996 to determine top management turnover. Turnover is classified as normal or routine by examining news articles in the atel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macarthy's News Information Service.
SamDle Firms Always-in-Compliance
AdoDted-Cadburv Never-in-Compliance 
TableID Top Executive Turnover in UK Finns Grouped by Quartiles of Performance over 1989 through 1996
Top management turnover for a random sample of 460 publicly-traded non-financial UK firms grouped into quartiles based on performance measures in the two four-year periods during the interval 1989 to 1996. lAROA is calculated as earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by the total book value of assets less the median performance of firms in the same Financial Times industriaJ grouping. Three years of lAROA are averaged. CERs are cumulative market model excess returns computed using daily returns beginning 36 calendar months prior to, and ending 2 days prior to the announcement of the top executive change. Top executive turnover is any change in the CEO. Turnover is classified as normal or routine by examining news articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macanhy's News Infonnation Service. The sample firms are classified into 3 sets based on whether they were (a) Always-in-Compliance, (b) Adopted-Cadbury recommendations and (c) Never-in-Compliance with the Cadbury recommendations. Sample firms in (a) and (c) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, preand post-publication of the Cadbury Report (1989-1992 and 1993 to 1996) . Sample firms in (b) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre-and post-adoption of the Cadbury recommendations (y-4 to y-I and y+1 to y+4).
Interval
Quartile 1 Results of logit regressions of top management turnover for a random sample of 460 publicly-traded non-financial UK firms in two four-year periods during the interval 1989 to 1996. IAROA is calculated as earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by the total book value of assets less the median performance of firms in the same Financial Times industrial grouping. Three years of IAROA are averaged. Top executive turnover is any change in the CEO. Turnover is classified as normal or routine by examining news articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macarthy's News Information Service. The sample firms are classified into 3 sets based on whether they were (a) Always-in-Compliance. (b) Adopted-Cadbury recommendations and (c) Never-in-Compliance with the Cadbury recommendations. Sample firms in (a) and (c) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre-and post-publication of the Cadbury Report (1989-1992 and 1993 to 1996) . Sample firms in (b) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre-and post-adoption of the Cadbury recommendations (y-4 to y-I and y+l to y+4). Accounting information and share prices are from Datastream. Dependent variable equals one when turnover occurs. Dum for 1993-96 variable equals one for the period 1993-1996. Dum-for-Adopt equals one for the period following the adoption of the key recommendations of the Cadbury Report. The interactive dummy is Dum-for-Adopt multiplied by IAROA. P-values are in parentheses. Results of logit regressions of top management turnover for a random sample of 460 publicly-traded non-financial UK firms in the two four-year periods during the interval 1989 to 1996. CERs are market model cumulative excess returns computed using daily returns beginning 36 calendar months prior to, and ending 2 days prior to the announcement of the top executive change. Top executive turnover is any change in the CEO. Turnover is classified as normal or routine by examining news articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macarthy's News Information Service. The sample firms are classified into 3 sets based on whether they were (a) Always-in-Compliance, (b) Adopted-Cadbury recommendations and (c) Never-in-Compliance with the Cadbury recommendations. Sample firms in (a) and (c) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre-and post-publication of the Cadbury Report (1989-1992 and 1993 to 1996) . Sample firms in (b) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre-and post-adoption of the Cadbury recommendations (y-4 to y-l and y+l to y+4). Accounting information and share prices come from Datastream. Dependent variable equals one when turnover occurs. Dum 1993-96 equals one for the period 1993-1996. Dum-far-Adopt equals one for the period following the adoption of the key recommendations of the Cadbury Report. The interactive dummy is Dum-for-Adopt multiplied by CER. P-values are in parentheses. 
